Tomi Francis

I am a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Philosophy at the Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford. I work in moral philosophy and decision theory. Currently I mostly think about questions which are relevant for assessing the strengths of our moral reasons to improve the long-term future of humanity. At the moment, that mostly means population ethics, interpersonal aggregation, and moral decision making under conditions of risk. I also work on the ethics of artificial intelligence.

More about me here. Download my CV here. Some useful materials for students can be found here.

Website updated: October 2024                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

Contact information:
Email: tomi dot francis at philosophy dot ox dot ac dot uk

Address: Global Priorities Institute, Trajan House, Mill Street, Oxford OX2 0DJ, UK     

Research

Publications

Francis, T. "The Welfare Diffusion Objection to Prioritarianism". Economics and Philosophy (2024), 40: 1, 55-76. [Article | Preprint]

Francis, T. "Intrapersonal Arguments for the Repugnant Conclusion". Ethics (2023), 134: 1, 89-107. [Article | Preprint]

Francis, T. and Karhu, T. "Getting Machines to do Your Dirty Work". Philosophical Studies (2023). [Article | Preprint]

Francis, T. "Anonymity and Non-Identity Cases". Analysis (2021), 81: 4, 632-639. [Article | Preprint]

Thesis

Totalism 

Supervised by Prof. Hilary Greaves and Dr. Teruji Thomas. [Manuscript]

Completed Drafts (Many of these are under review, or about to be, and I have therefore not made them available online. But I would be very happy to share them if you are confident that you are not one of the reviewers!)

A paper arguing that the best versions of partial/limited aggregation do not direct us to ignore small probabilities of many people being seriously harmed. (Soon to be under review; link omitted).

A paper arguing against the neutrality of creating happy people. (Under review, link omitted).

A paper arguing that the Procreation Asymmetry is less compelling than it is commonly assumed. [Link to draft]

A paper providing an impossibility theorem regarding avoidance of the Repugnant Conclusion which does not appeal to the Mere Addition Principle or any fellow-traveller. (Under review, link omitted).

A paper defending the principle of Stochastic Dominance from the objection from opaque sweetening cases, co-authored with Johan E. Gustafsson. (Under review, link omitted).

A paper arguing for Totalism from risky existence cases (Under review, link omitted).

Papers under construction (I don't have publicly shareable versions of these, but email me if you're interested in seeing early versions.)

"Prudence in Different-Number Fission Cases"

"Population Axiology Without Identity"

"Ignore Outlandish Possibilities" (with Petra Kosonen)

"Partial Aggregation in Variable Population Cases"

"An Argument Against Full Incomparability" (with Johan E. Gustafsson)

"Transitivity and Option-Set-Dependent Betterness"